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Abstract
This paper contributes to the study of 
Egypt’s 25 January Revolution and to a 
more general understanding of revolu-
tions and counter-revolutions. I turn to 
Gramsci’s concepts of hegemony, passive 
revolution, and the Modern Prince to 
understand the weakness of revolution-
ary subjectivity. Moreover, I argue that the 
concept of prefiguration serves as a criti-
cal addendum to Gramsci’s discussion of 
a new emancipatory politics embodied by 
the Modern Prince. Conversely, Gramsci’s 
concept of hegemony helps us to under-
stand the theoretical and practical limits 
of prefigurative politics. By presenting the 
Egyptian counter-revolution as a labyrin-
thine structure, the paper cautions against 
simplistic views of reaction and the lure 
of processes of ‘democratic transition’ 
and mass movements ‘from above’ that 
derail revolutionary agency from its key, 
emergent purpose: to develop itself into 
a social power able to construct the alter-
native society it imagines.
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Introduction
‘The people want the fall of the regime’ was the slogan of hundreds of thousands of demon-
strators during the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings of 2011, invoking popular agency and a 
collective will opposed to ‘the regime’ or ‘the system’. Zooming in on the trajectory of this 
popular subject I suggest that the success of the ensuing counter-revolution was due to a 
deflection, fragmentation, and displacement of revolutionary organisation and agency from 
2011 onward. In order to understand the capacity – or lack thereof – of popular power to 
transform society, I turn to Antonio Gramsci’s (1891–1937) concepts of hegemony, passive 
revolution and the Modern Prince.1 The first section of the paper discusses these notions 
against the background of the historical and contemporary political issues Gramsci wanted 
to solve. I touch upon Gramsci’s appropriation of Sorel’s myth and Machiavelli’s centaur. 
Subsequently, I develop Peter Thomas’s suggestion that ‘… the fully developed concept of 
hegemony in the Prison Notebooks should be understood as a contribution to the develop-
ment of a prefigurative theory of a politics of another type of the subaltern social groups…’.2 
I criticise the consequentialist conception of ‘revolution’ and argue that an understanding of 
revolutionary practice should contain the element of prefiguration. I explain what is meant 
by prefiguration, very briefly outlining the history of the concept and the views of some of its 
main proponents. Then I investigate the concrete prefigurative politics of the Egyptian rev-
olution, focusing on the ‘Republic of Tahrir’. In the fourth and fifth part I turn my eye to the 
counter-revolution and its main actors, discussing the role of the military and the Muslim 
Brotherhood. I present the minotaur as a new political form through which the counter-rev-
olution succeeded in 2013. I conclude the paper with an overview of the weaknesses of the 
revolutionary subject in Egypt, which were entwined with the strengths of the counter-revo-
lutionary forces, and vice versa. I indicate how this experience can inform and strengthen a 
political practice that unites prefiguration and hegemony.
Gramsci’s Prince
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony has travelled through the disciplines of the social sci-
ences, being interpreted as ruling by consent instead of by force; as the homogenisation 
of a social group into a political body; as anti-politics; and as geopolitical supremacy. 
Peter Thomas underlines that these interpretations share a view of hegemony as a general 
theory of political power. Instead, hegemony should be understood as a ‘dialectical chain’ 
consisting of four ‘moments’: ‘first, hegemony as social and political leadership; second, 
1   References to Gramsci’s Quaderni del Carcere (Prison Notebooks) follow Valentino Gerratana’s anno-
tation system (cf. www.internationalgramscisociety.org), whereby Q stands for the notebook number 
and § indicates the section. Cross-references with the Selections from the Prison Notebooks are marked by 
SPN in the text, cf. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks: Edited and translated by Quintin 
Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971). Cross-references with the Further 
Selections from the Prison Notebooks are indicated by FS, cf. Antonio Gramsci, Further Selections from the 
Prison Notebooks: Edited and translated by Derek Boothman (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1995).
2   Peter Thomas, ‘Hegemony, Passive Revolution and the Modern Prince’, Thesis Eleven 117 no. 1 (2013): 
25.
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hegemony as a political project; third, the realisation of this hegemonic project in the 
concrete institutions and organisational forms of a “hegemonic apparatus”; and fourth, 
ultimately and decisively, the social and political hegemony of the workers’ movement’.3 
To be clear: hegemony is a general theory of modern political power, in the sense that cap-
italist modernity created a new form of class power that was no longer chiefly rooted in 
domination – openly authoritarian class rule, whereby the ruled are the passive and external 
object of state power. Domination describes the relation between the dominant class and 
subaltern (=subordinate) groups that do not accept its leadership.4 Conversely, hegemony 
defines the asymmetrical alliance between the ruling class and elite and subaltern groups 
that actively accept its political, social, cultural and/or economic leadership and prestige. 
At its core, hegemony is class leadership, consisting of the articulation of a systemic worl-
dview, of the formation of intellectuals organic to the class from which they emerge and of 
the ‘seduction’ of intellectuals from other social groups to the hegemonic project.
Returning to Marx’s idea of the ‘universal class’ in his Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,5 
Gramsci appreciates the universal inclusivism of bourgeois hegemony: 
The previous ruling classes were essentially conservative in the sense that they 
did not tend to construct an organic passage from the other classes into their 
own, i.e. to enlarge their class sphere ‘technically’ and ideologically: their con-
ception was that of a closed class. The bourgeois class poses itself as an organism 
in continuous movement, capable of absorbing the entire society, assimilating it 
to its own cultural and economic level. The entire function of the State has been 
transformed; the State has become an ‘educator’.6 
This ‘organic passage’ from society to the bourgeois class was formally realised in the polit-
ical community – ‘the state’ in its narrow sense – in which every citizen is equal before the 
law; and in the civil community, where ‘[t]hose social elements which were most highly 
endowed with energy and spirit of enterprise rose from the lower classes to the ruling class-
es’.7 Political citizenship and the opportunity for individual social and economic promotion 
to the ranks of the bourgeoisie were the mechanisms of this organic passage. Whereas the 
dominant classes of the Ancien Régime ruled society almost ‘from the outside’, the bour-
geoisie ruled by absorbing and becoming society and reshaping it in its own image.8 
Gramsci understood the promise of an ‘organic passage’ in terms of modernity’s mobilising 
myth, a concept he appropriated from revolutionary syndicalist Georges Sorel (1847–1922). 
A political myth is ‘a political ideology expressed neither in the form of a cold utopia nor 
as learned theorizing, but rather as a creation of concrete fantasy which acts on a dispersed 
and shattered people to arouse and organize its collective will’.9 Criticising Sorel’s ‘sponta-
neist’ conception of hegemony, Gramsci argued that this myth had to be actively organised 
3   Ibid, pp. 24–5.
4   SPN 57; Q1§44.
5   Karl Marx, ‘A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction’, in Karl Marx: 
Early Writings (London: Penguin, 1992), pp. 243–57.
6   SPN 260; Q8§2.
7   SPN 80f49; cf. Q5§48.
8   Peter Thomas, The Gramscian Moment: Philosophy, Hegemony and Marxism (Leiden: Brill, 2009), p. 143.
9   SPN 126; Q8§21.
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and maintained.10 Hegemony does not emerge through contingent ideas or sentiments: in 
order to become a structured worldview and an enduring passion, a political myth has to be 
embodied by a hegemonic apparatus: ‘the material organisation meant to preserve, defend, 
and develop the theoretical or ideological “front’’’.11 More specifically: ‘the wide-ranging 
series of articulated institutions (understood in the broadest sense) and practices – from 
newspapers to educational organisations to political parties – by means of which a class 
and its allies engage their opponents in a struggle for political power’.12 
Although Gramsci recognises that modern society is saturated by hegemony in all its 
pores, he doesn’t advance a decentralised conception of power. Hegemony is concen-
trated in the hegemonic apparatus of the party. However, Gramsci defines a party not as 
a clearly delineated, electoral organisation, but as the political organisation of a class and 
as such ‘an embryonic State structure’.13 Formally different parties may represent the same 
class, or a single party can contain multiple class projects. Drawing on Niccolò Machia-
velli’s (1469–1527) concept of Il Principe (The Prince), which articulated a modern notion 
of politics through the ideal type of the individual political ruler, Gramsci likened the 
modern party to a ‘modern prince’: ‘an organism, a complex element of society in which 
a collective will, which has already been recognized and has to some extent asserted itself 
in action, begins to take concrete form’.14
The universalist and inclusionary claims of modern politics do not exclude force and 
violence. Gramsci turns to Machiavelli’s figure of the centaur to explain ‘the “dual per-
spective” in political action and in the life of the state… force and consent, domination 
and hegemony, violence and civility… agitation and propaganda, tactics and strategy’.15 
Machiavelli posits that: 
there are two ways of contesting, the one by the law, the other by force; the first 
method is proper to men, the second to beasts; but because the first is frequently 
not sufficient, it is necessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore it is neces-
sary for a prince to understand how to avail himself of the beast and the man. This 
has been figuratively taught to princes by ancient writers, who describe how Achil-
les and many other princes of old were given to the Centaur Chiron to nurse, who 
brought them up in his discipline; which means solely that, as they had for a teach-
er one who was half beast and half man, so it is necessary for a prince to know how 
to make use of both natures, and that one without the other is not durable.16 
As a student of Chiron, the bourgeois Prince has to rely on a combination of force (vio-
lence and coercion), fraud, corruption and consent-generating policies.17 The difference 
between bourgeois domination and hegemony is not the quantitative proportion between 
coercion and consent, but the degree to which force is successfully grounded in popular 
10   SPN 128–9; Q13§1.
11   FS 155–6; Q3§49.
12   Thomas, The Gramscian Moment, p. 226.
13   Q3§42; SPN 226.
14   Q13§1; SPN 129.
15   Q8§86; SPN 169–170.
16   Nicolo Machiavelli, The Prince Revised, Translated by W.K. Marriott, Edited by Anthony Uyl (Ingersoll: 
Devoted Publishing, 2019), XVIII§1, 54.
17   Q1§48.
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consent.18 The hegemonic rule of the dominant class can very well rely on a disproportion-
ate use of force (war, occupation, state violence), as long as this is accepted by its allies. 
For Gramsci, the ideal type of revolutionary bourgeois hegemony is historically repre-
sented by the Jacobin leadership during the French Revolution. Through his study of the 
Risorgimento (the process of Italian unification and state formation), the failed revolutions 
of 1848 and the rise of Fascism, Gramsci concluded that, ultimately, bourgeois hegemony 
was a failed project. The Jacobin revolutionary leadership was replaced by a process of 
passive revolution.19 In Gramsci on Tahrir I have discussed in detail how Gramsci devel-
oped the notion of passive revolution as a criterion to interpret the failure of bourgeois 
hegemony.20 The concept draws our attention to the agency and capacity of dominant 
groups to maintain power, even in times of crisis, by a diverse ‘repertoire of reaction’: rev-
olutions ‘from above’; reformism and gradual social transformations; state intervention 
and expansion; Bonapartism/Caesarism; trasformismo (‘transformism’; i.e. the cooptation 
of subaltern groups and their intellectuals); and the displacement and fragmentation of 
revolutionary movements from below. 
For Gramsci, the notion of hegemony was simply ‘the present form of the …doctrine of 
permanent revolution’.21 In his March 1850 Address of the Central Committee to the Com-
munist League, Marx had posited that although the German proletariat should support 
the democratic petty bourgeoisie in its fight against Prussian absolutism, its revolution 
had to be made ‘permanent’: when the radical petty bourgeoisie had attained its dem-
ocratic reforms, the working class should continue its own struggle until it conquered 
(and dismantled) state power.22 The Marxian notion of permanent revolution expressed 
the always-present strategic possibility of social or human emancipation, whereby the 
struggle of the proletariat would organise a real organic passage of society, thereby abol-
ishing capitalism, the state and class society. Hence proletarian hegemony was not merely 
the working class replacing the bourgeoisie as a ruling class, it also constituted the birth 
of a new politics – a new politics that was already being developed before the conquest 
of state power. Whereas bourgeois hegemony tries to preserve the distance between the 
leaders and the led, proletarian hegemony attempts to overcome this distance.23 Referring 
to Marx’s third thesis on Feuerbach that ‘it is essential to educate the educator him-
self ’,24 Gramsci stressed the need for a ‘dialectical pedagogy’ between leaders and led. 
The proletarian Prince should not only be a political organ, but ‘a coalition of the rebel-
18   Cf. Thomas, The Gramscian Moment, pp. 162–5.
19   Cf. Thomas, The Gramscian Moment.
20   Brecht De Smet, Gramsci on Tahrir: Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Egypt (London: Pluto Press, 
2016); cf. Brecht De Smet, ‘Rejoinder: Tahrir in Gramsci’, Review of African Political Economy 45 no. 155 
(2018): 135–45.
21   Q13§7; SPN 56n5; cf. SPN 242. Cf. Peter Thomas, ‘Uneven Developments, Combined: The First World 
War and Marxist Theories of Revolutions’, in Cataclysm 1914: The First World War and the Making of 
Modern World Politics, ed. Alexander Anievas (Leiden: Brill, 2015), p. 297.
22   Karl Marx, ‘The Class Struggles in France: 1848 to 1850’, in Marx-Engels Collected Works 10 (Moscow: 
Progress Publishers, 1978), pp. 127, 281.
23   Q15§4; SPN 144.
24   Marx, ‘Concerning Feuerbach’, in Early Writings, p. 422.
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lious subalterns, engaged in acts of self-liberation of hegemonic politics – a pedagogical 
laboratory for unlearning the habits of subalternity and discovering new forms of conviv-
iality, mutuality and collective self-determination’.25 This idea of contentious politics as a 
political and social ‘laboratory’ has more recently been articulated by the proponents of 
prefigurative politics.
Prince or Prefiguration?
Surprisingly, there has been an extensive debate among Middle East scholars whether the 
mass mobilisations of 2011 constituted a revolution at all. I have argued elsewhere against 
a consequentialist conceptualisation of revolution, which defines a process on the basis of 
its outcomes.26 The consequentialist approach was famously articulated by Theda Skocpol 
in States and Social Revolutions, who underlined that: ‘successful sociopolitical transfor-
mation – actual change of state and class structures – [are] part of the specification of 
what is to be called a social revolution’.27 Actions that lead up to structural changes are 
understood from the standpoint of the end result. For example, emphasising that Egypt’s 
political and economic system had not been transformed in any substantial way after the 
fall of Mubarak, labour historian Joel Beinin posited that: ‘The January 25 Revolution is not 
over. Rather, it has not yet occurred’.28
Such a consequentialist approach is problematic because, by eliding the defining factor 
of revolutionary agency and prefiguration, it cannot account for failed revolutions and 
successful counter-revolutions. The revolutionary process that happens before struc-
tural changes involves the intentions29 and efforts30 of collective actors to establish a 
new political and social order. The Arab uprisings and the Egyptian 25 January 2011 
insurrection in particular illustrate that revolutions are already taking place before 
the appropriation of state power and institutional change.31 In Egypt, the 2011 uprising 
was a decisive episode within a longer revolutionary process. The early 2000s saw the 
emergence of street politics: demonstrations in solidarity with the Second Palestinian 
Intifada; mass protests against the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon; and the civ-
il-democratic movement of Kefaya (‘Enough’). Workers went on strike and established 
independent trade unions to improve wages and working conditions. Farmers protested 
against increasing rents and land grabbing, occupying their plots and creating cooper-
atives. The 25 January insurrection rendered explicit a revolutionary process that was 
25   Thomas, ‘Hegemony, passive revolution and the modern Prince’, pp. 32–3.
26   Cf. De Smet, Gramsci on Tahrir.
27   Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions. A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 4.
28   Joel Beinin, ‘Was There a January 25 Revolution?’ Jadaliyya, 25 January 2013. Available at http://www.
jadaliyya.com/pages/index/9766/was-there-a-january-25-revolution (accessed 25 February 2020).
29   Gilbert Achcar, The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising (London: Saqi Books, 2013), 
p. 16.
30   Jack Goldstone, ‘Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory’, Annual Review of Political 
Science 4: 142.
31   Charles Tilly, European Revolutions 1492–1992 (London: Wiley, 1996).
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already building up in the decade before 2011.32
Studying revolutions means taking into account the formation of collective subjects and 
their prefigurations of alternative societies. From 2011 onward the popular uprisings in 
Tunisia and in Egypt stimulated and transformed regional and global grassroots politics. 
In the West, existing networks of alterglobalisation activists and new movements such as 
the Indignados and Occupy Wall Street were inspired by the occupation of Midan Tahrir, 
which not only presented a strategic example of how a dictator could be defeated, but also 
an imaginary of a new society in the ‘here and now’.
Such ‘imagining practices’ have been called instances of prefiguration or prefigurative pol-
itics, especially by anarchist authors such as Uri Gordon, David Graeber, Benjamin Franks, 
Marianne Maeckelbergh and Mathijs van de Sande; and ‘autonomist’ Marxists such as John 
Holloway, Michael Hardt and Toni Negri. The term prefiguration was first used by the 
council communist Carl Boggs to refer to ‘the prefigurative tradition, which begins with the 
nineteenth century anarchists and includes the syndicalists, council communists and the 
New Left’.33 Boggs defined ‘prefigurative’ as ‘the embodiment, within the ongoing political 
practice of a movement, of those forms of social relations, decision-making, culture, and 
human experience that are the ultimate goal’.34 Reiterating Marx’s adage that the emanci-
pation of the working class had to be the work of the working class itself, Boggs stressed 
that Communist politics should not only be focused on ameliorating the living conditions 
of workers, or even the strategic conquest of state power, but on the creation of organs 
of self-governance through the struggle. Boggs’ opposition between the strategic and the 
prefigurative dimension of popular struggle was further developed by Wini Breines, who 
asserted that: ‘Every genuinely radical social movement must come to grips with the con-
flict between grassroots self-activity and participation on the one hand, and organisational 
maintenance, efficiency and strategy on the other’.35 Breines studied the civil rights, students 
and new social movements of the 1950s–1970s, especially the case of the Students for a 
Democratic Society (SDS), highlighting their spontaneous, decentralised and participatory 
character. Breines put the relation between means and ends at the centre of the opposition 
between strategic and prefigurative politics, claiming that ‘the new left chose not to be strate-
gic; it chose to fail according to traditional political standards and definitions… The process, 
the means, the participation and the dialogue were as important as the goal’.36
32   Sami Zemni, Brecht De Smet and Koenraad Bogaert, ‘Luxemburg on Tahrir Square: Reading the Arab 
Revolutions with Rosa Luxemburg’s The Mass Strike’, Antipode 45 no. 4 (2013): 888–907; Maha Abdel-
rahman, Egypt’s Long Revolution: Protest Movements and Uprisings (London and New York: Routledge, 
2014); Anne Alexander and Mostafa Bassiouny, Bread, Freedom, Social Justice: Workers and the Egyptian 
Revolution (London: Zed Books, 2014); Joel Beinin, Workers and Thieves: Labor Movements and Popular 
Uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015).
33   Carl Boggs, ‘Marxism, Prefigurative Communism, and the Problem of Workers’ Control’, Radical 
America 11 no. 6 (1977): 100.
34   Ibid.
35   Wini Breines, ‘Community and Organization: The New Left and Michels’ “Iron Law”’, Social Problems 
27 no. 4 (1980): 427.
36   Ibid, p. 422.
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Today ‘prefiguration’ presents itself as an elastic term embodying a diversity of imprecise 
and even contradictory meanings. Authors have described the substance of prefiguration as 
‘a vision of the sort of society you want to have in miniature.’37 However, it is unclear how 
such an imagination of an alternative society is materially grounded in the present order 
of things. Thus prefiguration as ‘a foretaste of what truly democratic society might be like’38 
indicates that the future is not only imagined and foreshadowed, but also savoured in the 
present. Prefiguration signifies that people are able to experience the new society before it is 
actualised. Even more specific is its definition as ‘an enactment of the ultimate values of an 
ideal society within the very means of struggle for that society.’39 The substance of prefigura-
tion then appears as a certain type of activity: ‘prefiguration is something people do.’40
The notion of prefigurative politics or strategy implies that this performance is not only a 
simulacrum of an alternative society, but somehow constitutive of it. The content of this 
activity has been interpreted as ‘a nucleus of a future socialist state [creating] an entirely new 
kind of politics, breaking down the division of labour between everyday life and political 
activity’;41 an instrument ‘to develop the seeds of liberation and the new society (prior to 
and in the process of revolution)’;42 ‘modes of organisation that consciously resemble the 
world you want to create’;43 the process that ‘ensures that the movement would be ready 
with alternative governing structures that have been tried and tested’;44 and ‘forms of open-
ended subject making that are embedded in and constitutive of collective struggle’.45 
These views highlight different shades of the mediating role of prefigurative activity in the 
creation of a new society. They share an understanding that prefigurative activity encom-
passes the generation of new social forms: prefigurative structures. The relation of these 
structures to the future alternative society is unclear, however. Do they represent cell-
forms from which a more complex and complete society is to be developed, or is it already 
that society but in miniature form? In the first case, prefigurative structures require a qual-
itative development; in the second merely a quantitative (spatial) expansion. There is 
an important difference between, on the one hand, ‘bridging the temporal distinction’ 
between the actual and the potential, between the ‘here and now’ and ‘a future alternative 
37   David Graeber in Mathijs van de Sande, ‘Fighting with Tools: Prefiguration and Radical Politics in the 
Twenty-First Century’, Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society 27 no. 2 (2015): 178, 
my emphasis.
38   David Graeber in Marianne Maeckelbergh, ‘The Road to Democracy: The Political Legacy of “1968”’, 
IRSH 56 (2011): 314, my emphasis.
39   Maeckelbergh, ‘The Road to Democracy’, p. 302.
40   Marianne Maeckelbergh, ‘Doing is Believing: Prefiguration as Strategic Practice in the Alterglobaliza-
tion Movement’, Social Movement Studies 10 no. 1 (2011): 3.
41   Boggs, ‘Marxism, Prefigurative Communism, and the Problem of Workers’ Control’, p. 104, my empha-
sis.
42   Breines, ‘Community and Organization’, p. 421.
43   Andrej Grubacic and David Graeber, ‘Anarchism, Or the Revolutionary Movement of the Twenty-first 
Century’, ZNet (6 January 2004), p. 5, my emphasis. 
44   Maeckelbergh, ‘Doing is Believing,’ p. 14.
45   Maple Razsa and Andrej Kurnik, ‘Direct Democracy and a politics of becoming’, American Ethnologist 
39 no. 2 (2012): 241.
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society;’46 and, on the other, altogether ‘removing the temporal distinction between the 
struggle in the present toward a goal in the future; instead, the struggle and the goal, the 
real and the ideal, become one in the present’.47 In the first instance there is a transition 
process or an entanglement between the present and the future, in which the present 
takes on some forms of the future but not immediately becomes it. This perspective is con-
gruent with a ‘genetic’ or developmentalist view of prefiguration as the cell-form or seed 
of an alternative society. This is also the view I endorse based on the experience of the 
Egyptian revolution, as I explain further in the text. Conversely, the latter example posits 
a complete identity between ‘the real’ and ‘the ideal’: the future society is immediately 
actualised through prefigurative activity.
Prefigurative thought challenges the notion of a predetermined, goal-driven political 
process. Sometimes a more or less dialectical concept of means and ends is put forward: 
‘the means aim to reflect and comply with the longer-term political goals.’48 This perspec-
tive recognises means and ends as separate yet homologous parts of the same process. On 
other occasions the critique of means and ends takes on the more extreme form of ‘a prac-
tice in which there is no clear qualitative difference between means and ends: both are, so 
to speak, mirrored in the practice concerned.’49 Maeckelbergh rejects the use of ‘strategy’ to 
refer to the pursuit of a singular and predetermined goal, instead, she advances the idea that 
prefigurative politics is a strategic and organisational process in itself.50 Means and ends 
are posited as two categories that stand in a relation of opposition – an opposition which 
is solved conceptually by making means and ends identical and practically by absorbing 
ends into means. From this perspective, direct action, a ‘physical intervention against state 
power in a form that itself prefigures an alternative,’51 appears as the smallest generative 
unit, the cell-form of prefigurative politics, or the tactics of an overall prefigurative strategy.52 
Sometimes prefigurative activity is conceived of as a dual strategy of confronting existing 
political structures while simultaneously building alternative ones: ‘Confrontation opens 
up the space necessary for experiments in horizontal democracy and it safeguards these 
spaces from cooptation’.53 However, prefigurative activity is also understood ‘as a process 
in which one tries to escape from dominant relations of repression and exploitation… The 
creation of alternative practices and structures is not primarily focused on the abolition of 
the state but instead on the ongoing reconfiguration of relations of property, production, 
and communication outside of the state.’54 Hence the occupation of Tahrir and the many 
international square-occupation movements in its wake appeared as the historical vindi-
cation of the traditions and principles that had been developing among alterglobalisation 
46   Van de Sande, ‘The Prefigurative Politics of Tahrir Square’, passim, my emphasis.
47   Marianne Maeckelbergh, The Will of the Many: How the Alterglobalisation Movement is Changing the Face 
of Democracy (London: Pluto, 2009), p. 67, my emphasis.
48   Mathijs van de Sande, ‘Fighting with Tools: Prefiguration and Radical Politics in the Twenty-First 
Century’, Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society 27 no. 2 (2015): 189.
49   Van de Sande, ‘The Prefigurative Politics of Tahrir Square’, p. 232.
50   Maeckelbergh, ‘Doing is Believing’, pp. 4–6.
51   David Graeber, ‘The New Anarchists’, New Left Review 13 (January–February 2002): 3.
52   Maeckelbergh, ‘The Road to Democracy’, p. 329.
53   Maeckelbergh, ‘Doing is Believing’, p. 14.
54   Van de Sande, ‘Fighting with Tools’, p. 183.
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activists. Prefigurative politics represented a qualitatively new way of doing politics that 
went beyond the discredited strategies and methods of both social-democratic reformism 
and revolutionary Marxism.
The Prince of Tahrir
Mathijs van de Sande conceived of the occupation of Midan Tahrir as a prime example of 
prefiguration: ‘a political action, practice, movement, moment or development in which 
certain political ideals are experimentally actualised in the “here and now”, rather than 
hoped to be realised in a distant future’.55 Elements of prefigurative politics were already 
present in the tangle of political and social movements that had prepared the groundwork 
for the 25 January uprising. For example, workers, farmers and political activists were 
already experimenting with new forms of organising and democratic decision-making, 
and new types of solidarity between subaltern groups were emerging.56 Such molecular 
politics of prefiguration remained limited in their practical and geographical scope, but 
they acquired a qualitatively new dynamic when the masses entered the streets during the 
18-day uprising in 2011. 
The 25 January uprising started as a series of demonstrations, directing moderate demands 
towards those in power. Despite the importance of protests happening in Alexandria, in 
provincial cities such as Mahalla and Suez and in the countryside, the centre of gravity 
of the insurrection was undeniably Tahrir Square, which ‘became the epicentre of a rev-
olution. Protesters not only transformed it, they were themselves transformed by their 
presence in it. Tahrir became a revolutionary organism unto itself.’57 Tahrir was able to 
play this role because of its location in the geographical and political heart of Cairo. It 
was ‘a major transport hub surrounded by vital elements of the state apparatus: the par-
liament, several ministerial buildings, and the imposing Mogamma.’58 Furthermore, the 
occupation was rooted in a history of popular contention: ‘Liberation Square’ referred 
to the 1919 revolutionary uprising against British colonialism. In 2003 Tahrir had already 
been occupied for ten hours in protest against the war in Iraq.59 Hence when street fights 
broke out between protesters and the Central Security Forces (CSF), it was a logical step 
to occupy and hold Tahrir to make a stand against the riot police. The occupation of 
Tahrir was merely a means to protect the demonstration against police brutality. On 
Friday 28 January traditional social meetings after the Friday midday prayers organically 
transformed into political mass demonstrations. Demonstrations turned into huge street 
fights with the police. The revolutionaries conquered social spaces that were formerly 
controlled by the state. Occupation was no longer a means to protest against the state, for 
55   Van de Sande, ‘The Prefigurative Politics of Tahrir Square’, p. 230.
56   Cf. Abdelrahman, Egypt’s Long Revolution; Alexander and Bassiouny, Bread, Freedom, Social Justice; 
Beinin, Workers and Thieves; Brecht De Smet, A Dialectical Pedagogy of Revolt: Gramsci, Vygotsky, and the 
Egyptian Revolution (Leiden: Brill, 2015).
57   Ashraf Khalil, Liberation Square: Inside the Egyptian Revolution and the Rebirth of a Nation (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 2012), p. 5.
58   Muhammad A. Rashed, ‘The Egyptian Revolution: A Participant’s Account from Tahrir Square, January 
and February 2011’, Anthropology Today 27 no. 2 (2011): 23.
59   Khalil, Liberation Square, p. 39.
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it expelled the state, creating the space for structures to develop organically from below. 
Occupation became a goal in itself.
The ‘freed zone’ was increasingly dubbed the ‘Republic of Tahrir’ by participants and 
observers.60 The spontaneous (i.e. not planned in advance) character of the mass move-
ment did not prevent it from organising itself: committees defended, cleaned, entertained 
and governed Tahrir. If anything, Tahrir represented ‘spontaneous order out of chaos’.61 
In order to maintain the occupation tents, blankets, food and water had to be provided. 
The 18 days of occupation transformed Midan Tahrir into a ‘city of tents’ where injured 
protesters were treated, clothes were washed, toilets and stations for charging mobile 
phones were installed, nurseries were set up and so on.62 Football ‘ultras’ offered their 
‘skills in banner writing, chanting, and the use of fireworks’.63 Famous artists and actors 
joined the occupiers, but there were also amateur cartoonists, musicians and singers who 
emerged from the self-organising activity of Tahrir.64 Stages were erected where anyone 
could speak, sing, act, recite or play music.65 In short: the occupation of Tahrir created the 
freedom to enjoy art, love and life in new ways.66
A revolution is of course not only a ‘festival of the oppressed and exploited’,67 but also a 
confrontation with the state, which has to be defeated in order for the prefigured practices 
to continue to exist and thrive. Dual power – a situation in which a new political power 
centre is emerging while the old still exists68 – is the logical outcome of mass, revolution-
ary prefiguration. Besieged by the state the square needed directive organs and practices 
of deliberation and decision-making. Leaders consisted of both experienced activists and 
capable men and women who emerged within the ranks of protesters. Political activists 
distributed leaflets with practical tips and tricks for demonstrators, for example what to 
do when being attacked by tear gas. The occupiers learned to use the ‘bestial’ side of cen-
tauresque power. State repression and attacks by civilian Mubarak supporters – especially 
during the infamous ‘Battle of the Camel’ on Wednesday 2 February – changed the square 
60   Cf. Khalil, Liberation Square.
61   Mohammed Bamyeh, ‘The Egyptian Revolution: First Impressions from the Field [Updated]’, Jadaliyya, 
11 February 2011. Available at www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/561/the-egyptian-revolution_first-impres-
sions-from-the (accessed 25 February 2020); Samuli Schielke, ‘“You’ll Be Late for the Revolution!” An 
Anthropologist’s Diary of the Egyptian Revolution,’ Jadaliyya, 8 February 2011. Available at www.jadali-
yya.com/pages/index/580/youll-be-late-for-the-revolution-an-anthropologist (accessed 25 February 
2020).
62   Sahar Keraitim and Samia Mehrez, ‘Mulid al-Tahrir: Semiotics of a Revolution’, in Translating Egypt’s 
Revolution: The Language of Tahrir, ed. Samia Mehrez (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2012), 
p. 28.
63   Ibid, p. 53.
64   Sinan Antoon, ‘Singing for the Revolution’, Jadaliyya, 31 January 2011. Available at www.jadaliyya.com/
pages/index/508/singing-for-the-revolution (accessed 25 February 2020).
65   De Smet, A Revolutionary Pedagogy of Revolt.
66   Cf. Rashed, ‘The Egyptian Revolution’.
67   Vladimir I.U. Lenin, ‘Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution’, Lenin: Collected 
Works Volume 9 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1962), pp. 15–140.
68   Cf. Vladimir I.U. Lenin, ‘The Dual Power’, Lenin: Collected Works Volume 24 (Moscow: Progress Pub-
lishers, 1964), pp. 38–41.
Brecht De Smet 15 
from a ‘utopian street party’ into ‘Fortress Tahrir’.69
The Republic of Tahrir functioned as Gramsci’s modern myth, as a ‘concrete fantasy’. 
From the activities of protesting and occupying emerged prefigurative structures that in 
turn organised these mobilisations as a political subject. Moreover, this subject was based 
on a broad coalition of subaltern groups, which constructed their collective will through 
an inclusive and democratic social laboratory and a dialectical pedagogy between leaders 
and masses. Hence Tahrir serves as a concrete example of Gramsci’s Modern Prince: an 
emancipatory practice transcending modern (party) politics. 
Yet Tahrir also dramatically illustrated that prefigurative politics is a necessary, but insuffi-
cient condition for the creation of hegemony. The Egyptian uprising broke down the state 
as ‘the unity of the ruling classes’,70 rendering it disorganised, but not defeated. The CSF 
was replaced by military troops who did not confront the protesters head-on, but who pre-
ferred a literal war of position, digging ‘urban trenches’ around important state sites, such 
as parliament, the Maspero Radio and Television building, the presidential palace and the 
stock exchange.71 The Tahrir occupiers organised their own structures of self-governance, 
but these embryonic instances of dual power did not dismantle the existing state struc-
tures. If the 25 January uprising represented a nationwide ‘war of movement’, in Gramsci’s 
terminology, then Tahrir was the eye of the storm, a ‘war of position’ where protesters 
were loath to confront the military, digging their own trenches for a war of attrition with 
the regime, hoping Mubarak would leave of his own accord, like Ben Ali did in Tunisia.
The Military Minotaur
Paraphrasing Gramsci, one cannot study the historical movement of the subordinate 
classes in separation from the movement of the ruling classes – one cannot understand 
revolution without counter-revolution.72 Counter-revolutionary movements not only 
react upon revolutionaries’ conquest of power, but they attempt to prevent revolutionary 
actors from gaining power.73 Reaction already occurs simultaneously with or even before 
the revolutionary action it reacts upon. During the 18 days of the uprising, the regime tried 
to defeat the country-wide protests by using every element in its tactical ‘repertoire of 
reaction’: deploying the CSF on a massive scale, using water cannons and shooting rubber 
bullets and teargas canisters; spreading propaganda through government-controlled 
media; mobilising loyal supporters – the so-called baltageyya (thugs) – in violent attacks 
on peaceful demonstrators; disrupting internet and mobile phone communications; 
organising a capital strike; ordering curfews; sowing chaos by releasing prisoners and 
sending traffic and neighbourhood police to the barracks; offering political and economic 
concessions in exchange for an end to the protests; wooing and intimidating opposition 
69   Khalil, Liberation Square, pp. 243, 247.
70   Cf. Q8§182; SPN 366.
71   Cf. Khalil, Liberation Square, p. 208.
72   Q13§29; SPN 202.
73   Nick Bisley, ‘Counter-revolution, Order and International Relations’, Review of International Studies 3 
no. 1 (2004): 49–69.
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leaders; and brutal assassinations of protesters by rooftop snipers.74 Finally, when the CSF 
and police were defeated the army was called into the streets to restore order. 
The experience of the Egyptian revolution asserts that ‘the regime’ is not a passive and 
homogeneous obstacle that has to be overcome, but that the concept covers a ‘varied 
range of dominant elites [acting] against a credible threat to overturn them from below.’75 
This alliance does not only consist of ‘Egyptian’ forces, but also contains regional, inter-
national and transnational actors, such as Saudi capital; US geopolitical interests; and the 
IMF. It represents a political economy that is structured by enduring (neo)colonial and 
peripheral development, rentierism, neoliberal reform, financialisation and geopolitical 
coalitions.76 It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into detail about the international 
and transnational dimension of revolution and counter-revolution in Egypt.77
After the defeat of the CSF, the entrance of tanks in the streets signalled a power shift 
from the Mubarak clique and the Ministry of Interior to the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces (SCAF),78 consisting of the Defence Minister, the Chief of Staff and other 
high-ranked officers. For the military elites, the uprising represented both a threat to the 
status quo and an opportunity to improve their position within the ruling stratum.79 When 
protesters burned down headquarters of the ruling National Democratic Party in Cairo, 
soldiers did not intervene.80 This created confusion among the protesters about the polit-
ical character of the military apparatus. When tanks and APCs moved into the centre of 
Alexandria, Cairo and Suez, they were often welcomed by demonstrators who hoped that 
the army would join forces with them.81 The imaginary of the military as a revolutionary, 
popular actor was still rooted in the Nasserist experience of the 1950s and 1960s.82 
The misapprehension of the counter-revolutionary role of the armed forces among many 
protesters and the absence of an alternative leadership ‘from below’ allowed the generals 
to sidestep the emerging situation of dual power and present themselves as caretakers of 
the revolutionary process. The SCAF could not establish an open military dictatorship: 
directly after the uprising, any move toward military rule would reignite the revolutionary 
74   Khalil, Liberation Square; Rashed, ‘The Egyptian Revolution’; Joshua Stacher, ‘Egypt’s Democratic 
Mirage’, Foreign Affairs, 7 February 2011. Available at www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67351/josh-
ua-stacher/egypts-democratic-mirage?page=2 (accessed 25 February 2020).
75   Dan Slater and Nicholas R. Smith, ‘The Power of Counterrevolution: Elitist Origins of Political Order 
in Postcolonial Asia and Africa’, American Journal of Sociology 121 no. 5 (2016): 1472.
76   Adam Hanieh, Lineages of Revolt: Issues of Contemporary Capitalism in the Middle East (Chicago: Hay-
market Books, 2013).
77   Cf. Jamie Allinson, ‘Counter-Revolution as International Phenomenon: The Case of Egypt’, Review of 
International Studies 45 no. 2 (2019): 320–44.
78   Kandil, Liberation Square, p. 227.
79   Ibid, p. 5.
80   Paul Amar, ‘Why Mubarak Is Out’ in The Dawn of the Arab Uprisings: End of an Old Order?, eds Bassam 
Haddad, Rosie Bsheer, and Ziad Abu-Rish (London: Pluto Press: 2012), pp. 83–90.
81   Walter Armbrust, ‘The Revolution against Neoliberalism’ in The Dawn of the Arab Uprisings, eds 
Haddad, Bsheer and Abu-Rish, pp. 113–23.
82   Brecht De Smet, ‘Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Egypt’, Science & Society 78 no. 1 (2014): 11–40l; 
Sara Salem, ‘Critical Interventions in Debates on the Arab Revolutions: Centring Class’, Review of African 
Political Economy 45 no. 155 (2018): 125–34.
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process. The best option for the survival of the Egyptian ruling classes was that the mili-
tary placed itself at the head of the revolution and lead it in order to defeat it. Moreover, the 
armed forces were pressured by their Western allies into developing a civil façade.83 
Using Gramsci’s criterion of passive revolution, the ‘soft’ military coup that ended the 18 
days did not initiate a period of ‘democratic transition’, which would eventually fail and end 
in 2013 with the fall of Egypt’s first civilian president Muhammad Morsi. Instead, I argue 
against much of the literature that it heralded a period of counter-revolution in democratic 
form.84 The military wanted to re-establish state power, but gradually, without provoking 
another uprising. The top-down process of ‘democratisation’ was based on military-super-
vised elections, plebiscites and constitution-making, which were deployed as weapons of 
restoration and state rebuilding. Forms of popular, direct democracy that were still being 
molecularly prefigured within the enduring demonstrations, occupations and workplace 
protests were excluded from the military-led process of democratisation, which empha-
sised procedure and representation within the narrow sphere of the state. This severed 
the connection between political and social struggles and thus between liberal-oriented 
middle classes, industrial workers, peasants and the urban poor. Strikes and social protests 
were reprimanded for being fiʾawi (factional) and opposed to the national good.85 
As the reverberating revolutionary myth could not simply be demolished it was hollowed 
out from within. Nationalism had been an integral part of the 2011 uprising, but at the 
time it was a grassroots and inclusive national-popular sentiment that pitted al-shaʿb (the 
people) against al-nizam (the system). ‘The people’ included Copts and Muslims, lower 
and middle classes, men and women, young and old people. While this revolutionary 
nationalism foregrounded an Egyptian instead of an Arab or Muslim identity, it consid-
ered itself politically as a part of a regional uprising. The ‘counter-revolution in democratic 
form’ went hand in hand with a discursive struggle waged by regime parties, state media 
and corporate interests to shift nationalism’s popular, political, regional content to a 
culturally essentialist, exclusivist and authoritarian interpretation of what it was to be 
‘Egyptian’.86 The discursive opposition between ‘revolutionary’ and ‘counter-revolution-
ary’ was displaced by the binary of ‘Egyptian’ versus ‘un-Egyptian’ rioters and foreign spies.
Elections and referenda fragmented and redirected the organised, collective will that had 
been built on Tahrir and in the streets and workplaces. The qualitative majority of the 
streets was submerged in the quantitative majority of the polling booths, which was dom-
inated by the conservative majority of the ‘couch party’: layers of the population that had 
stayed at home and had not (yet) participated in the democratic experiment of Tahrir, the 
strikes or the popular committees. Moreover, by controlling the pace and agenda of elec-
tions and referenda, the SCAF was able to create cleavages within the broad revolutionary 
83   Achcar, The People Want, p. 236.
84   Cf. De Smet, ‘Rejoinder: Tahrir in Gramsci’.
85   Hesham Sallam, ‘Striking Back at Egyptian Workers’, Middle East Research and Information Project 259 
(Summer 2011).
86   Hoda Elsadda in Sherene Seikaly, Laila Shereen Sakr, Hoda Elsadda, Pascale Ghazaleh, and Lina 
Attalah, ‘Who are “the people”?’ Mada Masr, 11 February 2015. Available at https://madamasr.com/
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alliance. The constitutional referendum on 19 March 2011 divided the revolutionary move-
ment into ‘secularists’ against ‘Islamists’. In the next two years revolutionary groups and 
parties remained unsuccessful in establishing a revolutionary ‘third current’ in between 
the military and the Islamist camp, which consisted mainly of the Muslim Brotherhood 
and the Salafist parties. The failure of the revolutionary camp to organise itself led to the 
foregrounding of the conflict between the regime and the Islamist wing of the count-
er-revolution. In Egypt this failure was reflected in the presidential elections of 2012, 
which cleared the way for Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s coup in 2013.
The Labyrinth of Counter-Revolution
The deposal of President Muhammad Morsi in 2013 has been framed by scholars and 
activists as a missed opportunity for democratic transition.87 Witnessing the massacre of 
Brotherhood sympathisers at Rabea al-Adawiya Square and the return to a de facto mili-
tary dictatorship under Sisi in 2013, it is understandable that Morsi’s presidency evokes 
the feeling of a missed chance to ‘democratise’ Egypt. Yet this nostalgia masks the lab-
yrinthine counter-revolutionary character of this period.88 In February 2011 the Ikhwan 
(Brotherhood) leadership supported the military ‘soft coup’ and called upon protesters 
to leave Tahrir Square and start negotiations with the SCAF. This continued the Broth-
erhood’s position of ‘loyal opposition’ to the regime of the Mubarak era. The movement 
presented itself as a power broker between the generals and the popular masses,89 desiring 
political recognition and the addition of its own businessmen such as Khayrat al-Shater 
to the ruling stratum.90 The Brotherhood began to obstruct demonstrations and strikes, 
proving its value as a counter-revolutionary force to domestic (especially military) and 
foreign (especially US) elites.91 In return for the Brotherhood’s ‘loyal opposition’ the SCAF 
released Ikhwan activists from prison and recognised the movement’s political apparatus: 
the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). Scheduling early elections was also to the advantage 
of the Brotherhood as it was the most organised opposition force.92 
However, the alliance between the SCAF and the Brotherhood was instable and charac-
terised by distrust and competition. The Muslim Brothers’ landslide in the parliamentary 
elections of 2011 encouraged them to nominate their leader Khayrat al-Shater as a candi-
date for the presidential elections of 2012. As the SCAF prohibited al-Shater from running 
for office, the Ikhwan fielded Muhammad Morsi instead. In the first round of the elec-
87   E.g. Carrie R. Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement (Princeton: Princ-
eton University Press, 2013). 
88   E.g. Anne Alexander and Sameh Naguib, ‘Behind every Caesar a new one? Reflections on revolution 
and counter-revolution in Egypt in response to Gramsci on Tahrir,’ Review of African Political Economy 
45 no. 155 (2018): 91–103.
89   Anne Alexander, ‘Brothers-in-Arms? The Egyptian Military, the Ikhwan and the Revolutions of 1952 
and 2011’, Journal of North African Studies 16 no. 4 (2011): 536.
90   Andrea Teti and Gennaro Gervasio, ‘After Mubarak, before Transition: The Challenges for Egypt’s 
Democratic Opposition (interview and event analysis)’, Interface: A Journal for and about Social Move-
ments 4 no. 1 (2012): 102–12.
91   Hanieh, Lineages of Revolt, pp. 170–1.
92   Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood, pp. 170–2.
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tions, the ‘revolutionary’ candidates Hamdeen Sabahi and Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh 
were beaten by a slim margin into third and fourth place respectively by Morsi and regime-
aligned candidate Ahmed Shafiq. In the second round, Egyptians were forced to choose 
between Morsi and Shafiq. Morsi’s slim victory over Shafiq not only revealed a deep polit-
ical divide, but it actively forced a choice upon the revolutionary will between two wings 
of the counter-revolution: secular, military dictatorship or civil Islamism, both rooted in a 
neoliberal social and economic project.
Morsi’s presidency represented a more confident ‘counter-revolution in democratic 
form’.93 Similar to the Tunisian Islamists he tried to develop a hegemonic project based on 
the notion of al-Nahda (Renaissance), translating the radical demands of the 25 January 
uprising – bread, freedom and social justice – into moderate slogans of prosperity, dignity 
and stability. He deflected popular initiative by presenting himself as the chief defender of 
popular revolutionary demands, while seeking at the same time a pragmatic compromise 
with junior leaders of the Armed Forces. Morsi’s constitutional declaration of 12 August 
2012 retired the old generation of SCAF generals such as Hussein Tantawi and Sami Anan. 
The new President raised junior officer Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to the position of Defence 
Minister and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.94 The constitution of 26 December 2012 
shielded the defence budget from parliamentary oversight and maintained that the Minis-
ter of Defence was to be chosen from the ranks of the military. 
The transformation of the form of government from a more or less outright military dic-
tatorship to a presidential democracy veiled the fact that the so-called ‘deep state’ – the 
elite networks, bureaucratic centres of decision-making and authoritarian structures such 
as the military and the Ministry of Interior – remained intact. Instead of destroying the 
structures of dictatorship the Brotherhood tried to capture positions in the cabinet, min-
istries, state unions and professional associations. Morsi cooperated with businessmen 
from the Mubarak era, continuing neoliberal reforms that aggravated enduring problems 
of unemployment, purchasing power and unfair taxation.95 Morsi also accepted a new IMF 
loan, the implementation of which was stalled in the face of popular protests.96 Labour 
protests faced state repression. Facing competition from the influential Salafist parties, in 
order to become hegemonic within the Sunni Islamist camp, Morsi remained largely silent 
on sectarian attacks against Shiʿa and Coptic minorities.
Gramsci’s concepts of hegemony and passive revolution help us to understand the Morsi 
episode as essentially counter-revolutionary, as it continued to block the development of 
prefigurative structures from below, displacing popular initiative with state agency from 
above. The Brotherhood’s preservation of the deep state prepared the way for the triumph 
93   Cf. Roberto Roccu, ‘Again on the Revolutionary Subject: Problematising Class and Subalternity in 
Gramsci on Tahrir’, Review of African Political Economy 45 no. 155: 104–14, pace Alexander and Naguib, 
‘Brothers-in-Arms?’.
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able at www.egyptindependent.com/opinion/view-officers-club (accessed 25 February 2020).
95   Wael Gamal, ‘The Brotherhood’s One Percent’, Jadaliyya, 18 July 2012. Available at https://www.
jadaliyya.com/Details/26638 (accessed 25 February 2020); Maria C. Paciello, ‘Delivering the Revolution? 
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of the counter-revolution from 2013 onward. 
In the autumn of 2012, popular discontent resurfaced because of the Brotherhood’s inabil-
ity and unwillingness to democratise the deep state and to solve the economic crisis. Facing 
increasing subaltern and elite opposition, Morsi’s constitutional declaration on 22 Novem-
ber 2012 temporarily granted him absolute executive and legislative powers. This move 
appeared to confirm the worst fears among secular opposition forces about a ‘Brother-
hoodisation’ of state and society. The opposition against the presidency crystallised in the 
National Salvation Front (NSF), which united right-wing opposition figures such as Amr 
Moussa, liberal-democrats such as Muhammed al-Baradei, Nasserists such as Hamdeen 
Sabahi, leftist trade union leaders such as Kamal Abu Eita, and former Mubarakists against 
the Brotherhood. The presence of feloul elements – supporters of the old Mubarak régime 
– in the ranks of the NSF ironically strengthened Morsi’s claim that it was not the Broth-
erhood, but the opposition that represented the counter-revolution. While both camps 
claimed to represent the revolutionary path against dictatorship, they each contained a 
mix of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces, in which the counter-revolutionary 
leadership prevailed. The NSF was dominated by the military, while the movement sup-
porting the presidency was led by the Ikhwan. This division showed the failure of Morsi 
to unite the ruling classes into a stable state, as well as the success of both counter-rev-
olutionary camps to fragment, subordinate and absorb popular initiative and preventing 
the independent formation of subaltern leadership. By the end of 2012 vertical relations of 
hegemony between fractions of capital and their social base cut through the 2011 revolu-
tionary horizontal alliance between middle classes, workers, peasants and youth. 
At the end of April 2013, the Tamarod (Rebel) campaign was established, which collected 
signatures calling on President Morsi to step down. A wide range of leftist and rightist 
opposition forces participated in the door-to-door campaign, reconnecting national pol-
itics to the streets and workplaces. In this regard, Tamarod represented a new wave of 
popular mobilisation ‘from below’. However, by deploying the concept of hegemony, it 
becomes clear that the nature of this mass movement was qualitatively different than that 
of the 2011 uprising. From its inception, Tamarod was infiltrated by elements of the Minis-
try of Interior and supported by both Mubarakist and opposition businessmen.97 Whereas 
the state apparatus had tried to repress and divide the 2011 movement, now revolutionary 
activists became co-opted in a joint struggle against the Brotherhood. The class leadership 
of the mass movement consisted of the better-off, secular middle class, which saturated 
the protests with its reactionary slogans, appealing to the military leadership to liberate 
Egypt from the Ikhwan.98 
Tamarod launched the 30 June Front to organise protests against the President on the day 
that commemorated his first year in power, demanding his resignation. Morsi refused to 
step down, underlining his legitimacy as democratically elected president. On 1 July 2013 
97   Asma Alsharif and Yasmine Saleh, ‘Special Report: The real force behind Egypt’s ‘revolution of the 
state’, Reuters, 10 October 2013. Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-interior-specialre-
port-idUSBRE99908D20131010 (accessed 25 February 2020).
98   Sameh Naguib, ‘From the End of One Revolutionary Wave to Preparing for Another’, openDemocracy, 
22 July 2014. Available at https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/sameh-naguib/from-end-of-
one-revolutionary-wave-to-preparing-for-another (accessed 25 February 2020).
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Sisi, as head of the armed forces, issued an ultimatum to both camps to solve the crisis 
within 48 hours. After two more days of deadly clashes the 30 June Front met with military 
leaders. Once again, the absence of an independent revolutionary leadership allowed the 
military to play the role of arbiter.99 Shortly after the meeting Sisi declared that President 
Morsi had been removed from his position and that chief Justice Adly Mansour would 
head a transitional government as interim president. Morsi was arrested and the army 
occupied key political and economic sites in the country. 
Returning to Machiavelli’s allegory of power it becomes clear that Sisi’s hegemony was not 
grounded in a centauresque hybrid of a human upper body (=consent) standing on bestial 
legs (=coercion), but in a minotauresque monstrosity with a bull’s torso (=military lead-
ership) moving on human legs (=popular will). Tamarod was headed by the generals and 
their allies and put into motion by popular mass support. This ‘counter-revolution from 
below’ succeeded where two years of ‘counter-revolution in democratic form’ had failed: 
re-uniting the ruling classes and re-establishing their state. Not only did Sisi liquidate the 
Brotherhood as a political and economic competitor, but he succeeded in uniting under 
his leadership the warring factions within the Armed Forces;100 the Ministry of Interior; the 
Mubarakist oligarchs; anti-regime businessmen; and the liberal and Nasserist opposition. 
The ‘concrete fantasy’ of this counter-revolution from below was an anti-myth. Sisi’s 
minotauresque leadership was not rooted in the masses’ own prefiguration or utopian 
passion for liberation from oppression, but in their negative sentiments of fear and uncer-
tainty, which were channelled into an authoritarian project of hysterical ultra-nationalism 
that revolved around the liquidation of the Brotherhood as the ‘enemy within’.
The Thread of Revolution
The Prince of Tahrir was thrown in the labyrinth of counter-revolution, facing the mino-
taur at its centre. Even if the monster could be defeated, escaping from the maze was 
impossible without a thread. This thread was already unravelling in 2011. Towards the end 
of the 18-day occupation, the war of attrition between the Republic of Tahrir and the state 
was heading towards a violent resolution. Once a source of inspiration, Tunisia’s example 
was now becoming a brake on the Egyptian insurrection, as revolutionaries still hoped that 
Mubarak would simply resign like Ben Ali had done. Revolutionary occupation, which had 
been the motor of the uprising in previous days, now became a bottleneck for its further 
development. Despite its evocative prefigurative activity, the emerging collective will at 
Tahrir lacked the necessary structures for coordination and direction. At the zenith of the 
occupation, Tahrir could have been turned into a constitutional assembly or a people’s 
parliament, sharply positing the question of dual power and the revolutionaries’ indepen-
dence from existing forms of state power. 
It is important to remember that in the end it was not the occupation of Tahrir that led to 
the fall of Mubarak, but the convergence of two other movements: demonstrations moving 
from Tahrir to sites of state power such as parliament, the presidential palace and army 
99   De Smet, ‘Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Egypt’; De Smet, Gramsci on Tahrir.
100   Alexander and Bassiouny, Bread, Freedom, Social Justice, p. 208.
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barracks; and the entrance of workers as class actors – as opposed to political citizens – in 
the revolutionary process. In its early stages the lack of a centre leading the revolution had 
been an advantage to the movement: it was impossible for the state to defeat the masses 
by co-opting, dividing or liquidating their leadership. However, when a situation of dual 
power was gradually emerging, the masses needed to go beyond occupation. The absence 
of a directive centre – a hegemonic apparatus – locked the movement into its war of attri-
tion. Once the government ended its capital strike on 7 February, workers began to strike, 
reigniting the uprising. They demanded the setting of a minimum wage, the employment 
of temporary workers, the return of privatised companies to the state, the reinstatement 
of workers fired for striking and equal pay for workers. Again Tahrir functioned as a key 
political laboratory: in the square, representatives of the four independent unions decided 
to constitute the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU) as a poten-
tial centre for the workers’ movement.  Although workers often did not list the fall of the 
regime among their formal demands, they chanted the same radical slogans as the occu-
piers on Tahrir.101 Whereas the revolutionary mass movement had confronted capital in 
its concentrated but roundabout appearance as the state, the working class confronted 
capital directly at its many fragmented points of production and distribution, revealing 
the class nature of the state as it came to capital’s aid. The strikes posed a direct threat to 
the economic structure of the regime. 
When Mubarak was forced to step down, thousands of euphoric protesters remained over-
night in the square to celebrate his departure. The following morning protesters debated 
if they should continue to occupy Tahrir to safeguard the military’s promised transition to 
democracy. Once Mubarak had been removed, the ‘system’ was no longer represented in 
a tangible, concentrated form and its attributes – corruption, violence, authoritarianism, 
poverty and so on – became much more difficult to criticise concretely. Even though revo-
lutionary change was embodied by the living experience of Tahrir, it was not articulated in 
a proper political programme with clear demands. Protesters faced the challenging task of 
grasping the meaning of their own prefigurative activity, which went far ahead of their verbally 
expressed demands, as well as understanding the political and economic structures of the 
‘system’ they wished to overthrow. The military’s ‘soft coup’ cut right through this collective 
process of learning and organisation.102 Subaltern hegemony is blocked when its prefigura-
tive activity is halted. Tahrir Square was increasingly becoming a tourist site where T-shirts 
and souvenirs were sold, commemorating the revolutionary uprising instead of leading it.103 
After the departure of Mubarak, in order to transform the whole of the nation Tahrir had 
to turn itself inside out. Its revolutionary prefiguration had to be shared with neighbour-
hoods, villages and workplaces all over Egypt. The prefigurative politics of Tahrir had to 
shift from an imagination of an alternative society to the development of a hegemonic 
apparatus of the revolutionary movement, connecting the Square to the struggles waged 
101   Hossam al-Hamalawy, ‘Jan 25: The workers, middle class, military junta and the permanent rev-
olution’, Arabawy, 12 February 2011. Available at www.arabawy.org/2011/02/12/permanent-revolution 
(accessed 25 February 2020).
102   De Smet, A Dialectical Pedagogy of Revolt.
103   Laura Gribbon and Sarah Hawas, ‘Signs and Signifiers: Visual Translations of Revolt’, in Translating 
Egypt’s Revolution: The Language of Tahrir, ed. Samia Mehrez (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 
2012), p. 135.
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by the popular masses outside its borders, turning regime rejection into subaltern leader-
ship. In fact, this process of expansion and integration was already embryonically present 
during the 18 days. Tahrir had become a meeting and discussion place for protesters 
between different Cairene neighbourhoods, provincial cities and rural areas. Farmers who 
were not able to return home when the regime closed the roads joined in the protests at 
Tahrir.104 When protesters returned to their own social spaces, they transposed their pre-
figurative experience to these local sites of protests, sharing and diffusing the experience 
of Tahrir. However, these connections were anything but systematic and coherent. 
During the 2011 uprisings protesters demanded not only freedom, but bread and social 
justice too, which reflected the entwinement of democratic and economic justice move-
ments in the previous decade.105 At first, specific working-class demands were subsumed 
under the political goals of the movement. However, in the two years after the collapse 
of the Republic of Tahrir popular mobilisation shifted toward the Egyptian working class, 
which protested against adverse working conditions, low wages and the petty dictatorships 
of the ‘little Mubaraks’ presiding over public and private companies. New and indepen-
dent trade unions reached out to sections of the working class that hitherto had remained 
relatively passive: ‘Hospital doctors, mosque imams, fishermen, Tuk-Tuk drivers, skilled 
craftsmen, intellectual property rights consultants, daily-paid labourers and the operators 
of the “scarab boats” that take tourists on Nile river trips’.106 Some 700,000 farmers joined 
one of the four independent organisations that emerged after the uprising.107
Perhaps, if the Republic of Tahrir had been able to develop its own political organs then 
trade union structures such as the EFITU would have played an important role in the 
formation of popular power. But even if this had been the case, the independent trade 
unions that had developed over the past years ‘were too small in relation to the scale of 
the movement for their presence as an organised force to shape the overall outcome of the 
uprising, or even influence its direction much.’108 Furthermore, independent trade union-
ism became divided between the radical EFITU of Kamal Abu Eita and the more moderate 
and cautious Egyptian Democratic Labour Congress (EDLC) of Kamal Abbas. There was 
no coordinated collaboration between strikers, but only a de facto contemporaneity of 
worker protests. In short: the continuation of Tahrir’s prefigurative activity was necessary 
for a national workers’ movement to be established and, conversely, the development of 
class organisations were a precondition for the survival of the revolutionary project as a 
whole. This reflected the basic tasks of the revolution to succeed: a political, ‘democratic’ 
transformation could not succeed except by a reconfiguration of the economic structures, 
and the economic structures could not be transformed unless political power was cap-
tured and appropriated by the subaltern classes. 
104   Saker El-Nour, ‘Small Farmers and the Revolution in Egypt: The Forgotten Actors’, Contemporary 
Arab Affairs 8 no. 2 (2015): 198–211.
105   Alexander and Bassiouny, Bread, Freedom, Social Justice, p. 12.
106   Anne Alexander, ‘The Egyptian Workers’ Movement and the 25 January Revolution’, International 
Socialism Journal no. 133 (9 January 2012): 114–15. Available at  https://isj.org.uk/the-egyptian-work-
ers-movement-and-the-25-january-revolution/ (accessed 25 February 2020).
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Despite initiatives from leftist groups such as the Revolutionary Socialist Tendency and the 
Socialist Popular Alliance Party, a mass workers’ party that was organically connected to the 
trade union movement did not materialise. What’s more, the Nasserist wing of the workers’ 
movement would prove instrumental to the regime in displacing workers’ protests. Nas-
serist worker leaders were co-opted by the regime – the most famous example being Kamal 
Abu Eita, the EFITU leader who became Minister of Manpower in 2012. The ‘transformism’ 
of worker leaders such as Abu Eita was the coup de grâce for the EFITU, which was already 
weakened by internal strife. Secondly, the military mobilised the deep-seated resentment 
toward the Muslim Brotherhood in the workers’ movement. Hence the political campaign 
against Morsi also became a means of subsuming the workers’ movement under the leader-
ship of the military. Thirdly, the military’s promise of economic concessions, which echoed 
Nasserist redistributive policies, was often accepted by the workers.109
Knotting the Thread
The 18 days of the uprising showed that a revolution is not the fixed expression of an 
already-present popular will, but a generative process of self-emancipating practices and 
ideas. Emancipation is not an object external to the revolutionary process, lying in wait 
until the masses establish it ‘at once’, but it is immanent in the process of revolution itself. 
Instead of a ‘finished’ prefiguration that had to be spatially expanded and emulated, Tahrir 
was a moment in the development of a revolutionary ‘modern Prince’. This development 
was determined by the specific solutions it offered for overcoming the obstacles that were 
thrown into its path. With every forward step in the struggle against the regime, Tahrir was 
itself transformed. Tahrir illustrates that prefiguration does not simply emerge from the void 
that exists when state power is either pushed away or escaped. Struggle and prefiguration 
are not separate processes. On the contrary: prefigurative structures arise precisely when 
a movement interiorises practices of struggle that are initially outward-oriented, strategic, 
instruments, appropriating these practices as forms of mediation to develop its own agency. 
The means that protesters deployed to fight the state apparatus – the new forms of organ-
isation, community and decision-making they developed – became ends-in-themselves, 
prefiguring an alternative society. The antagonistic state does not stand ‘outside’ the prefig-
urative process, but it is an integral part of it as it reacts to revolutionary agency and thereby 
shapes the structures of resistance that become structures of self-governance. The success 
and failure of prefigurative projects such as Tahrir cannot only be judged in terms of the 
capacities of revolutionaries to confront state power and build a ‘modern Prince’, but also 
on the basis of the counter-revolutionary agency of the regime and its ability to displace and 
disintegrate subaltern hegemony. In the case of Egypt, the initial weakness of revolutionary 
leadership and the historical ambiguity of the character of the armed forces in 2011 led to the 
abandonment of prefigurative politics, of a dual power strategy and of constructing an inde-
pendent hegemonic apparatus. This in turn led to the self-subordination of the masses and 
most political activists, first to the counter-revolution in democratic form, then to a ‘count-
er-revolution from below’, which further weakened any subaltern hegemonic capacity.
109   Cf. Alexander and Bassiouny, Bread, Freedom, Social Justice, p. 313.
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